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Ironic implicature strength and the test of explicit cancellability 
Eleni Kapogianni, University of Kent 
   
Abstract: 
In this paper, the Gricean notion of explicit cancellability (Grice 1975, 19781) is used as a 
testable characteristic, able to indicate different degrees of strength for different types of 
(ironic) implicatures. According to the definition adopted for this analysis, implicature 
strength is determined by the likelihood of retrieval of an implicature in a specific context 
and, essentially, by the degree of certainty that the hearer maintains about the correctness of 
the inferred interpretation. Ironic implicature strength is considered to be the product of 
YDULRXVIDFWRUV³IDFWRUVRILPSOLFDWXUHVWUHQJWK´VRPHRIZKLFKDUHDOZD\VSUHVHQWVXFKDV
the type and strength of assumptions on which a derivation is based)  while others are optional 
and appear in tandem with specific irony strategies. Irony strategies are categorised into two 
general types (meaning reversal and meaning replacement), which are expected to show 
different degrees of implicature strength, being influenced by different factors. For the 
experimental testing of the hypotheses, subjects were presented with the task of judging the 
acceptability of the explicit cancellation of various implicated (ironic, as well as non-ironic) 
meanings. Findings show significant differences between irony types in terms of 
cancellability (measured as acceptability of cancellation ± AC), under the influence of (i) type 
of syllogism and associated assumptions, (ii) co-textual cues, and (iii) humorous framing. 




6LQFH *ULFH¶V SURSRVDO RI ILYH EDVLF FKDUDFWHULVWLFV IRU LPSOLFDWXUHV FDQFHOODELOLW\ QRQ-
detachability, calculability, not bHLQJ SDUW RI WKH H[SUHVVLRQ¶V FRQYHQWLRQDO IRUFH DQG
independence from truth conditions ± Grice 1975:57-58) many theorists have tried to use 
them in order to distinguish between implicated and nonimplicated meaning. Cancellability, 
in particular, has been the focus of discussion and debate, as far as its effectiveness in 
discerning implicatures is concerned, even if Grice himself made it clear that his five 
characteristics were not intended as tests (Grice 1978:114-115). 
                                                          
1
 *ULFH¶VRULJLQDOVSHOOLQJLV³FDQFHODELOLW\´ 
Ironic Implicature Strength and Cancellability 
 
,Q³)XUWKHUQRWHVRQ/RJic and ConvHUVDWLRQ´*ULFH-116) defines cancellability as 
follows: 
A putative conversational implicature p is explicitly cancelable if, to the form 
of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that p, it is admissible to 
DGG³EXWQRWS´RU³,GRQRWPHDQ WR LPSO\ WKDWS´DQG LW LV FRQWH[WXDOO\
cancelable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of 
words would simply not carry the implicature.  
 
Despite the fact that cancellability does not seem to be a sufficient condition for the presence 
of conversational implicatures (Grice 1978:116; Sadock 1991:373) it has been widely used as 
a test (Horn 2004). A number of studies have questioned the validity of cancellability as a test 
and even its validity as a unifying characteristic of implicatures (Weiner 2006; Burton-
Roberts 2006, 2013; Borge 2009; Capone 2009; Jaszczolt 2009; Geurts 2011:18-21; Feig 
2013; cf Blome-Tillmann 2008, Dahlman 2012, and Åkerman 2014 for using the test with 
revisions/caveats). Among other arguments, these current approaches point out the dual 
nature of the characteristic, which is clear in the Gricean definition quoted above, but had not 
received enough attention in the past (Carston 2010).  
As Jaszczolt (2009: 60-68) points out, contextual cancellability, i.e. the inability of a 
meaning to arise in certain contexts, is not even real act of cancellation, since there is no 
meaning to be cancelled in an imaginary context in which the implicature would simply not 
arise. However, even as a thought experiment, the search for such a context can be both 
helpful and informative: the inability of finding contexts that prevent a potential meaning 
from arising should be a very strong indication that this meaning is not implicated. 
Unlike the contextual cancellability thought experiment, which seems to work in a fairly 
straightforward way, explicit cancellability is a much more debatable criterion. The most 
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important feature of explicit cancellability, which is at the same time the main cause of 
disagreement among theorists, is the fact that it can only be applied inside the context of the 
utterance2. This means that we cannot approach and assess this characteristic by separating an 
utterance from its full context, i.e. the discourse situation, including the speaker, the hearer(s), 
and their common and individual assumptions. Keeping in mind that the two facets of the 
Gricean cancellability belong to different levels of language description (Jaszczolt 2009:262), 
an intriguing challenge arises when examining explicit cancellability and its potential 
formulation as a test for implicatures. 
The aim of the present study is to demonstrate the usefulness of explicit cancellability as a 
measure of (ironic) implicature strength. It is proposed, that is, that the strength of an 
implicature can be reflected on a scale of acceptability of explicit cancellation. This approach, 
however, cannot be justified unless we first draw some crucial distinctions: (a) explicit 
FDQFHOODELOLW\ IURP WKH VSHDNHU¶V YHUVXV WKH KHDUHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH DQG (b) speaker-intended 
implicatures versus putative implicatures. After treating these theoretical issues, we will turn 
to the phenomenon of verbal irony in order to discuss the notion of ironic implicature strength 
and formulate a set of testable hypotheses.  
2 What kind of meaning can be cancelled? 
Burton-Roberts (2006) argues that cancellation of Particularised Conversational Implicatures 
(henceforth PCIs) is impossible in context: if a meaning was intended it is impossible for the 
speaker to retract it and, if a meaning was not intended, it is simply not an implicature. 
Therefore, according to this line of thought (an earlier version of which appears in Capone 
2003, also revisited in Capone 2009), what looks like a cancellation phrase is in fact a 
                                                          
2 Blome-7LOOPDQQ¶VSURSRVal that the test can also be valid if  applied inside a context C´, similar to the original 
context C of the utterance does not seem justifiable enough (Jaszczolt, 2009:65-66) 
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clarification phrase, aiming to repair an infelicitous inference. This viewpoint emphasises that 
it is impossible for an implicature to DULVHLQGHSHQGHQWO\IURPWKHVSHDNHU¶VLQWHQWLRQV It is, 
however, possible to talk about ³SXWDWLYH LPSOLFDWXUHV´ LQ *ULFH¶V WHUPV RU ³SRWHQWLDO
LPSOLFDWXUHV´ contra Burton-Roberts 2013) and this is where a shift is required from the 
perspective of the speaker to the perspective of the hearer and the utterance itself3. This 
distinction between perspectives is compatible with the distinFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ³XWWHUHU
LPSOLFDWXUH´DQG³DXGLHQFHLPSOLFDWXUH´Saul 2002; Horn 2012; Haugh 2013). 
Consequently, there needs to be a distinction between the following statements that 
concern the production and retrieval of pragmatic (inferential) meaning and involve the 
speaker and the hearer(s): 
(1) a. The speaker intends to convey a meaning m by producing the utterance U in 
the context C. 
  b. The utterance U conveys meaning m in the context C. 
(2) a. The hearer retrieves meaning m by hearing the speaker produce the utterance 
U in the context C. 
 b. The utterance U has the potential of giving rise to meaning m in the context C. 
 
7KHUHLVDQREYLRXVGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQEDQGEZKLFKLVUHODWHGWRWDNLQJWKHVSHDNHU¶V
RU WKH KHDUHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH LQ D SUDJPDWLc theory which is concerned with intentions and 
recovery of intentions. It is clear that an analysis from the point of view of (1), would 
concentrate on the meanings that were intentionally conveyed through the utterance, while 
                                                          
3 Note that, according to Burton-Roberts (2013), Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs) would count as 
 ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞďĞĐĂŶĐĞůůĂďůĞ ?dŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ
potential implicatures that are context-dependent, i.e. that are linked to the utterance rather than the 
sentence. 
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any interpretations and inferences that the hearer(s) may draw from the utterance, if not 
intended by the speaker, would be considered incidental and/or irrelevant to the analysis.  
On the other hand, examining an interaction from the point of view of (2) leads to an 
utterance-based rather than intention-EDVHG DQDO\VLV WDNLQJ WKH KHDUHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH DQG
assuming that there are no problems in the transmission of the utterance, such as being 
misheard), it is reasonable to consider possible for an utterance to give rise to various 
inferences within a certain context, some of which may have not been intended (implicated) 
by the speaker (see also Sanders 2013).  
The question, of course, is whether some of these inferences can be considered as 
³SRWHQWLDO LPSOLFDWXUHV´ RI WKH XWWHUDQFH LQ a VSHFLILF FRQWH[W UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH VSHDNHU¶V
actual intentions. Among the many inferences that hearers draw from an utterance (e.g. 
LQIHUHQFHV DERXW WKH DVVXPHG FRPPRQ JURXQG WKH GHVFULEHG HYHQWV DQG WKH VSHDNHU¶V
attitudes), there are inferences concHUQLQJ WKH VSHDNHU¶V SULPDU\ DQG VHFRQGDU\ LQWHQGHG
meaning(s) (see Jaszczolt 2009; Haugh and Jaszczolt 2012). These are the inferences that can 
be classed as potential/putative implicatures. In other words, a meaning (proposition) that can 
reasonably be aWWULEXWHG WR WKHVSHDNHU¶VFRPPXQLFDWLve intentions, given the content of the 
utterance and the context, can be classed as a potential implicature. 
The present analysis approaches the semantic and pragmatic characteristics of the utterance 
through a parallel examination of its actual as well as its possible functions in a specific 
context, taking into consideration not only the successful and optimal interactions, in which 
the hearer recovers all and only the intended implicatures, but also complex interactions, in 
which both speaker and hearer negotiate the additional meanings of an utterance through pre-
emptive cancelling, speculative interpretations and repairs (see also Haugh 2008, Haugh 
2013). Under this perspective, each utterance is viewed as potential bearer of various 
implicatures, which may or may not be retrieved and/or cancelled.  
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The argument that studying inferential strength (of potential implicatures) does not 
necessarily involve tDNLQJWKHVSHDNHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHFDQUHFHLYHIXUWKHUVXSSRUWIURm the fact 
that it is possible for the speaker to have fuzzy intentions. There is such a great variety of 
IDFWRUV WKDW LQIOXHQFH WKH VSHDNHUV¶ DQG KHDUHUV¶ WKRXJKt processes during interaction, that 
every such process is always in a dynamic relationship with the ever-changing context and 
assumptions related to it (also pointed out in Jaszczolt 1996). Ambivalence of intentions can 
be due to different reasons, such as multiple and possibly incompatible goals or simply lack of 
certainty about the aims of what is communicated (see Jaszczolt 1996:706 discussing an 
example originally found in Sperber & Wilson 1986). 
Let us now return to the question of exploiting explicit cancellability as a test: how and for 
what purposes can it be used? First of all, as hinted earlier, there are two different possibilities 
for the case of unintended potential meanings of an utterance (see also Haugh 2013):  
 
(3) a. The speaker is aware of a potential implicature of her utterance U in the 
context C, which she does not intend to convey (and may choose to cancel it 
in advance). 
 b. The speaker is not aware of a potential implicature of her utterance in the 
context C, which she does not intend to convey (and may have to cancel it 
when/if retrieved by the hearer). 
In the present analysis, the second possibility (3b) and, more specifically, the case in which 
the speaker cancels the retrieved implicature, is what mostly concerns the formulation of 
explicit cancellability as a test. The fact that a hearer is able to draw an inference based on the 
VSHDNHU¶VXWWHUDQFHFODVVLILHVWKLVLQIHUHQFHDVDSRWHQWLDOLPSOLFDWXUHRIWKHXWWHUDQFH,QWKLV
FDVH WKHGHJUHH WRZKLFK WKHVSHDNHU¶V DWWHPSWRIFDQFHOODWLRQVHHPVSODXVLEOHIHOLFLWRXV LV
what appears to be measurable. 
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Finally, it is worth addresVLQJWKHH[LVWHQFHRI³XQFDQFHOODEOH´LPSOLFDWXUHVH[DPSOHVRI
which often come up in the literature (e.g. Weiner 2006 ± interestingly arguing for the non-
cancellability of an ironic example). It can be argued that, in most of these cases, what is 
³XQFDQFHOODEOH´LV WKHIDFW WKDW WKHVSHDNHUKDVPHDQWPRUHWKDQZKDW WKH\VDLGDQGQRW WKH
actual content of the implicature (Haugh 2013). Let us revisit a frequently discussed example, 
originally employed by Sperber and Wilson (1981): 
(4)   Max: Do you ever speak to Charles? 
  Ann: I never speak to plagiarists 
          +> Charles is a plagiarist  
a. 0D[,GLGQ¶WNQRZKHZDVDSODJLDULVW 
Ann: &KDUOHVLVQ¶WDSODJLDULVWEXWGLGQ¶W\RXNQRZKLVZLIHLV",ZRXOGQHYHU
speak to her, which is why I never speak to Charles either. 
b. 0D[7KDW¶VXQIDLULWZDVQ¶WHYHQSURYHGWKDWKHSODJLDUL]HG 
 Ann:  (??) But I was not suggesting that Charles is a plagiarist, I still speak to 
KLPVLQFH,GRQ¶WEHOLHYHKHSODJLDUL]HG 
 
Although convoluted, it is conceivable that Ann could implicate a meaning the retrieval of 
ZKLFKUHOLHVRQVRPHDVVXPHGFRPPRQJURXQGLHWKDW&KDUOHV¶ZLIHLVDSODJLDULVWDVZHOO
as some socio-cultural assumptions (something along the lines of: being in no speaking terms 
ZLWKVRPHRQH¶VVSRXVHOHDGVWRQRW speaking to them either). The reason for Max retrieving 
the wrong implicature in (4a) is him not sharing the common ground assumed by Ann. On the 
other hand, when there are no discrepancies in the shared common ground, it is infelicitous to 
cancel the implicature (in (4b), the allegation that Charles is a plagiarist is recognised by both 
speakers as part of the common ground).   
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The important observation here is that, depending on the context and the amount of shared 
information, some PCIs are harder to cancel than others.  It will be argued that this gradability 
of cancellability is the observable result of the gradability of implicature strength.  
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3 Verbal irony: a typological approach 
In order to explore the applications of the criterion of explicit cancellability for the purpose of 
reflecting different degrees of implicature strength, it is worth focusing on a phenomenon that 
consists in a complex interplay of semantic and pragmatic factors. It will be argued that verbal 
irony employs a variety of strategies for the creation of its rhetorical effect and these 
strategies, in turn, result in implicatures of variable strength. 
The prevalent pragmatic (Gricean/Post-Gricean) approaches to verbal irony (Grice 1978; 
Wilson & Sperber 1992; Clark & Gerrig 1984; Attardo 2000, among others) tend to focus on 
specific strategies (often a single strategy, VXFK DV ³HFKRLF PHQWLRQDWWULEXWLRQ´), without 
capturing the full range of instantiations of the phenomenon (as demonstrated by Dynel 
2013). This study relies on a set of conditions that are considered necessary and jointly 
sufficient for the presence of irony and contribute to its distinction from similar phenomena 
such as non-ironic humour or banter (see Kapogianni 2013; 2015; 2016): 
i. Background contrast: the ironic utterance needs to be triggered by some 
background conflict between ideas, reality and expectations, beliefs etc. 
ii. Incompatibility between some element of what is said and facts, common 
sense, world knowledge, salient contextual information or contextual 
expectations. 
iii. Evaluative attitude of the speaker towards some specified target (as noted by 
Grice 1978). 
The next step to understanding and analysing the phenomenon is to examine a wide variety 
of utterances that fulfil the aforementioned conditions and attempt a categorisation based on 
semantic/pragmatic criteria. These criteria should cover some important questions concerning 
the relationship between the expressed and the intended meaning, namely (a) is the intended 
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proposition semantically and/or logically related to the expressed proposition? and (b) what is 
the reasoning process that leads from the expressed to the intended proposition? 
Let us examine some examples coming from various irony strategies4, in order to see what 
the answer to these questions is for each: 
(5) ³This is a great party!´ [Intended: This is a terrible party] 
(6)  a. ³This dress is slightly overpriced!´ [Intended: This dress is extremely 
overpriced] 
 b. ³This car is going at the speed of light!´ [Intended: This car is going really 
slowly] 
(7)    A: I am going to pass this exam! 
  B: ³And I am the Queen of Romania!´  [Intended: Your claim is impossible] 
(8) Context: A job interview for a publishing company. 
 Candidate: Shall I introduce myself? 
 Interviewer: ³No you should sing as an aria from the marriage of Figaro!´ 
[Intended: Your question is unnecessary]  
Example (5) is considered a typical ironic example. As Giora (1995) has pointed out, the 
nature of the relationship between the expressed and the intended meaning is not that of 
direct, but that of indirect negation, since the intended meaning is not juVW ³QRW JUHDW´ EXW
³WHUULEOH´ ,n other words, the two meanings are antonyms. This is an indication that one of 
the main strategies for irony relies on scales (either with the use of actual scalar terms or, 
more frequently, with the creation of ad hoc scales). This observation becomes clearer in 
examples (6a) and (6b), in which irony appears as understatement ± overstatement, and scalar 
relationships have to be evoked for the retrieval of the intended meaning: ³VOLJKWO\  
                                                          
4 All examples in this section are based on ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐŽƌƉƵƐŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐŝƌŽŶŝĐƵƚƚĞƌĂŶĐĞƐ ?ŝŶ
spontaneous or scripted discourse  ? Kapogianni 2013). Some modifications for a more straightforward 
understanding of the intended meaning were deemed necessary, while two examples have been adapted from 
Greek (6b and 8). 
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moderately < considerably < H[WUHPHO\´for (6a) DQG³H[WUHPHO\VORZYHU\VORZVORZ
DYHUDJHVSHHGIDVWYHU\IDVWVSHHGRIOLJKW´for (6b). 
Examples (7) and (8), on the other hand, seem to work very differently. In example (7), 
which is rather conventionalised, the speaker makes an obviously false and outrageous claim, 
LQRUGHU IRU LW WR VHUYH DVDQ LURQLFFRPPHQWRQ WKHKHDUHU¶VH[SOLFLWO\DVVHUWHGRUDVVXPHG
beliefs. Example (8) works in a similar way, since the ironist says something highly 
irrelevant/inappropriate for the given context, in order to convey her evaluative attitude. In 
this irony strategy, the semantic meaning of the expressed proposition is not related to the 
meaning of the intended proposition. It is for this reason that the ironist could have used any 
other equally outrageous utterance in order to convey the same meaning (e.g. ³<HVand I am 
WKH(DVWHU%XQQ\´ in (7) or ³1RZHMXVWFalled you because we wanted to see you tap-dance´
in (8)). 
The examples discussed above seem to be divided into two categories (examples 5 and 6 
versus examples 7 and 8), their main difference being the kind of relationship between the 
expressed and the intended meaning. It is indeed the case that, through the investigation of a 
substantial corpus of ironic examples (compiled and researched in the framework of 
Kapogianni 2013) the various ironic strategies seem to fall into two main broad categories: 
 
Type1, ³PHDQLQJ UHYHUVDO´: As in examples (5&6), the ironic meaning is related to the 
expressed meaning through some case of meaning reversal, either relative (two opposite 
points on a scale, not necessarily the extremes), or absolute (as in the case of antonymy). 
 
Type2, ³PHDQLQJUHSODFHPHQW´: As in examples (7&8), the ironic meaning is a completely 
separate proposition of evaluative character, which, instead of being based on the expressed 
proposition, it replaces it. 
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Having addressed the first of the distinguishing criteria proposed before the discussion of the 
examples (the semantic and/or logical relationship between the intended meaning and the 
meaning of the expressed proposition) we now need to return to the second one: what is the 
reasoning process that leads from the expressed to the intended proposition? From the 
KHDUHU¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ LW LV REYLRXV that for both types, the recognition of the lack of 
sincerity/literalness is a prerequisite. For Type1, the derivation of the ironic meaning involves 
the reversal of (parts of) the expressed meaning, while for Type2 it involves a more complex 
reasoning process, as in (9): 
 
(9) Premise 1: The speaker answered with a comment (made an analogy) that 
suggests that if the trigger utterance5 is valid, then her utterance is also valid. 
  Premise 2: The explicit meaning of her utterance is obviously invalid. 
Conclusion: The speaker intends to invalidate (criticise, undermine) the trigger 
utterance. 
 
There is one further observation to be made concerning the distinct reasoning processes for 
the two proposed irony types. For Type1 ironies, the path of meaning reversal can be 
IROORZHGERWKZD\VGHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHURQHWDNHVWKHVSHDNHURUWKHKHDUHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH
the speaker reverses the intended meaning in order to produce the ironic utterance, while the 
hearer reverses the expressed meaning in order to infer the intended utterance. On the other 
hand, this two-ZD\UHODWLRQVKLSGRHVQ¶WKROGIRUType2 ironies: although it is easy to derive 
the intended meaning via the utterance, it is not possible to predict what outrageous/surreal 
                                                          
5
 ³7ULJJHUXWWHUDQFH´LVWKHXWWHUDQFHWKDWFDXVHVWKHLURQLFUHVSRQVH It usually, but not always, immediately 
precedes the irony in the case of Type2 ironies. 
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utterance the ironist will choose to use in order to convey the intended meaning of a Type2 
irony. 
Although both types of irony and their subtypes6 can be used with a humorous intention, 
Type2 ironies are much more intrinsically linked to humour than Type1 ironies (as shown in 
Kapogianni 2011). For Type2 ironies, there is a significant incongruity between the context to 
which each expression would belong if uttered sincerely/literally and the actual context. 
Notably, this incongruity is very different from the one that exists between the appropriate 
and the actual context of Type1 ironies, since, for the latter, the appropriate context is the 
mirror of the actual context (the context of a nice party as opposed to the context of a boring 
party for example (5)), while for Type2 ironies the context corresponding to the expressed 
proposition is absolutely and surprisingly irrelevant. In that sense, Type2 ironies approach and 
resemble the techniques of absurdist/surrealist humour (see also Attardo et al. 2002:25, 
Kapogianni 2011). This characteristic will be shown to have significant effects for the way 
the whole framework of discourse is interpreted (Test 1). 
                                                          
6
 A few of these strategies were included in the examples (such as overstatement and understatement), but I will 
not proceed to an exhaustive description of all possible subtypes, since it falls outside the scope of this paper. 
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4 Factors of (ironic) implicature strength 
The purpose of the division of the phenomenon of verbal irony into two types is the further 
investigation of correlations between different reasoning processes and a variety of factors 
(both general and specifically related to irony) that influence the strength of ironic 
implicatures. This section is aimed at determining the factors of ironic implicature strength 
and describing their effects. 
Before any further discussion, it is necessary WRFODULI\WKHWHUP³LPSOLFDWXUHVWUHQJWK´7KH
notion of strong/weak implicatures is frequently mentioned in the semantics/pragmatics 
literature (e.g. Ziegeler 2000; Geurts 2009; Wilson and Sperber 2012) although not always 
with the same content. Most of the post-Gricean uses of these notions are derived from 
6SHUEHUDQG:LOVRQ¶VDSSURDFKZKLFKHODERUDWHVRQWKHLVVXHVRIDVVXPSWLRQVWrength 
and implicature strength. For Sperber and Wilson, implicature strength is related to (mutual) 
manifestness and contrasted with implicature indeterminacy, i.e. the more determinate and 
manifest an implicature the stronger it is. Although the notion of implicature strength used in 
the present analysis is not too far from Sperber and :LOVRQ¶V WKHUH DUH VRPH notable 
differences that need to be pointed out. For Sperber and Wilson, the principle of relevance 
allows for only one desirable interpretation and one main intended implicature, which is 
necessarily the strongest of all possible implicatures of the same utterance. Weaker 
implicatures, for them, are those that may or may not be retrieved without affecting the main 
intended meaning (they can be, for example, implicatures that generate poetic or stylistic 
effects ± Sperber and Wilson 1986: ,Q VKRUW 6SHUEHU DQG :LOVRQ¶V account discusses 
implicature strength in terms of intentions rather than the likelihood of correct interpretation, 
which is the main focus here. A strong implicature, according to the current analysis, is one 
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that is easily derived, reinforced (or made salient) by a number of contextual/co-textual 
factors, and, therefore, difficultly defeasible.  
When it comes to irony in particular, LW LV XVHIXO WR WXUQ WR <XV¶V ³FULWHULRQ RI RSWLPDO
DFFHVVLELOLW\´ (Yus 2000) according to which the successful recognition of irony is 
determined by detectable incompatibilities within various elements of the context, common 
ground, and discourse7. These elements are incorporated in the following proposal but the 
categorisation of factors crucially considers the properties of the syllogisms behind irony 
derivation: 
 
(a) Richness of contextual information / common ground: The main resource of 
information to which the interlocutors resort during a successful interaction is, of course, 
the context. It goes without saying that the richer the available contextual information, as 
well as the common ground established during the interaction, the stronger the support 
offered to any inferences drawn from the uttered sentences. In example (4) (bearing the 
implicature ³Charles is a plagiarist´), the difference in strength of the implicature between 
(4a) and (4b) can be attributed to the difference in the amount of established common 
ground information. 
(b) Nature of assumptions needed for the derivation of implicatures: It is normally 
expected that the more widely/better established the character of the knowledge that serves 
as a source for these assumptions, the greater the possibility that these assumptions lead to 
confident conclusions, i.e. strong implicatures. For example, most Type2 ironies are easily 
recognisable because their literal meaning goes against common real-world knowledge, 
                                                          
7 Yus (2000) makes claims about processing and processing effort in his proposal. The present analysis 
considers the issue of implicature strength to be orthogonal to issues of processing: strong implicatures can be 
arrived at in different ways (different combinations of factors a-e) and regardless of processing effort. 
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and the hearers do not even need to resort to further contextual information in order to 
derive the implicature. This, however, is not the case for Type1 ironies, which heavily rely 
on situational (at-hand) context. 
(c) Reasoning process: Despite the fact that most PCIs are the result of abductive 
(nonmonotonic) reasoning, it can be argued that a case like Type2 ironies (as shown in (9)) 
LQYROYHVDGHGXFWLYHV\OORJLVPDQG LQSDUWLFXODUDPRGXV WROOHQV µLIS WKHQT¶ µLI \RXU
XWWHUDQFH LV YDOLG WKHQ VR LV PLQH¶ ± µQRW T¶ µP\ XWWHUDQFH LV REYLRXVO\ LQYDOLG¶ ± the 
FRQFOXVLRQLVµQRWS¶µ\RXUXWWHUDQFHLVQRWYDOLG¶ The conclusion of such a syllogism is 
expected to be drawn with a very high degree of certainty, as opposed to the relative 
uncertainty of an abductive syllogism. 
(d) Co-textual cues: The immediate co-text (the expressions that precede or follow an 
implicature trigger) is also responsible for the strength of the implicature. In the case of 
irony, the juxtaposition of an ironic expression and a literal one can occur within one 
sentence (at a sub-propositional level) and is a frequent sub-strategy of Type1 (otherwise 
NQRZQDV³R[\PRURQ´± Partington 2011). Such ironic implicatures are particularly strong, 
given the reinforcement received by the literally intended part of the utterance. 
(e) Prosodic cues and extra-/para-linguistic information. Although outside the scope of this 
paper, spoken interactions heavily rely on prosodic cues and extra-linguistic information 
such as facial expressions and gestures (Attardo et al 2003). These are usually employed to 
reinforce implicatures ± if not to trigger their own implicatures. It is important to note that 
intonation is very frequently used as an important recognition cue for Type1 (context 
dependent) ironies, while it has less to contribute to Type2 ironies, the recognition of 
which is granted by strong assumptions. 
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The variability of factors of implicature strength can justify the hypothesis that 
implicature strength is a gradable characteristic and inversely proportionate to 
cancellability (the stronger the implicature the more difficult it is for it to be explicitly 
cancelled). 
One final factor to be considered when using explicit cancellability as a test is the 
framework in which the cancellation phrase appears. Depending of the setting of the discourse 
(formal/informal, familiar/unfamiliar interlocutors, humorous/nonhumorous) different 
frameworks can be adopted, and even alternate, which then need to be recognized by the 
interlocutors in order for them to interpret each-RWKHU¶V utterances with accuracy. In the case 
of irony, for example, it is expected that, once the ironic intentions of the speaker are 
recognized and established, the interlocutors may opt to retain ironic and/or humorous speech 
as a framework and make their contributions accordingly (Kotthoff 2003). The adoption of 
such a framework, which deviates from the more normal/expected literal/nonhumorous 
framework, entails the danger of misunderstandings and interpreting utterances in the wrong 
framework. In that case, as already pointed out in the recent literature (Borge 2009:152, 
Weiner 2006:129, Jaszczolt 2009:263) a humorous framework, the cancellation phrase 
reinforces the implicature. 
5 7HVWLQJVSHDNHUV¶LQWXLWLRQV 
The general aim of the empirical part of this study is to compare the strength of different 
types of ironic and nonironic implicatures, testing specific predictions that are based on 
factors of implicature strength (as presented in the previous section). In particular, the factors 
of implicature strength considered here are: the nature of the derivation process, including the 
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syllogism and the nature of assumptions involved in it (factors b&c)8, the presence of co-
textual cues (factor d), as well as the emergence/adoption of a strong humorous framework 
through the dialogue (a factor which is specific to humorous interactions, including many 
cases of irony). Contextual richness (factor a) was treated as a controlled variable, in this case, 
given its independence from the investigated types of (ironic) implicature (i.e. the type of 
ironic implicature does not depend on the richness of context and vice versa). Finally, 
prosodic and extra-linguistic cues (factor e) were excluded from the tests, which were 
conducted in written form. 
5.1 Hypotheses 
 
Considering the above, the empirical part of this study tests the following four hypotheses: 
 
H1 Given an equal amount of contextual information, Type2 ironies are expected to be 
stronger implicatures than Type1 ironies, because the syllogism employed in their 
derivation relies on a restricted set of strong assumptions, as opposed to the syllogism 
employed in the derivation of Type1 ironies, which poses fewer restrictions on the 
amount and strength of the assumptions that can be used as its premises. This difference 
in strength will appear as a difference in cancellability: Type1 ironies are expected to be 
more cancellable (higher acceptability of cancellation ± henceforth AC) than Type2 
ironies (lower AC). 
                                                          
8 These two factors are considered together since they essentially determine the difference between Type1 
and Type2 ironies, leading to the same prediction regarding their strength (i.e. Type2 ironies are expected to be 
stronger than Type1 ironies), with factor (b), nature of assumptions, accounting for the finer differences in 
strength within each irony type. 
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H2 Type1 ironies are not expected to be different from non-ironic PCIs, since they do not 
differ in terms of their derivation process (employed syllogism and type of necessary 
assumptions). 
H3 The oxymoron strategy of juxtaposition of literally contradictory concepts within the 
same sentence (classified as a Type1 irony) is expected to be very difficult to cancel i.e. 
have a significantly low rating of AC, since the same-sentence co-textual cues strongly 
reinforce the irony implicature. 
H4 There is a strong relation between Type2 ironies and humour, which is responsible for 
higher percentages of retention of the ironic/humorous frame during the interpretation 
of Type2 ironic interactions (which is not the case for Type1 ironic interactions). 
The empirical testing is based on WKHHOLFLWDWLRQRIVSHDNHUV¶LQWXLWLRQVDERXWWKHDFFHSWDELOLW\
of cancellation of different types and subtypes of ironic meaning, also compared to the AC of 
non-ironic PCIs9. For the present study, acceptability is defined as the property of a phrase 
that sounds logical, makes sense, exhibits a degree of coherence with the preceding phrases in 
the dialogue, and is thought of as highly possible to occur in a natural (non-constructed) 
dialogue. 
5.2 Test 1 
5.2.1 Methods and participants 
The test was designed as an on-line questionnaire each item being a short 3-turn dialogue in 
English, the final turn of which (a cancellation phrase for the critical items) was evaluated for 
                                                          
9
 To WKHDXWKRU¶VNQRZOHGJH, there are no previous experiments in the literature testing different degrees of 
explicit cancellability.  Of course, cancellability has been directly or indirectly employed before in various tests 
for distinguishing between explicit and implicit meaning, such as in Katsos (2008). 
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its acceptability10.  A 7-point scale was used for the acceptability judgments, with point 1 
being labeled as ³WRWDOO\ XQDFFHSWDEOH´ DQG SRLQW  DV ³WRWDOO\ DFFHSWDEOH´ Seventy-two 
different dialogues were used as test items (with an addition of 3 more dialogues as training 
items at the beginning of the test) and they were divided into 4 types (of 18 items each) 
according to the implicature type they contained:  
i. Non-ironic PCIs (henceforth labelled PCI). 
ii. Ironies of Type1 (henceforth labelled T1). 
iii. Ironies of Type2 (henceforth labelled T2). 
iv. Type 1 iURQLHVRIWKH³R[\PRURQ´IRUP (henceforth labelled T1(Ox)). 
The test items were formulated on the basis of naturally occurring examples found in the 
DXWKRU¶VFRUSXVVHHIRRWQRWH4) and modified/adapted for the sake of uniformity in length and 
turn-taking structure (see Table 1 below). For each of the items, 3 different cancellability 
conditions were created, with 3 variations of the final turn of the dialogue: an uneventful 
closure of the dialogue (no cancellation phrase), representing WKH ³DFFHSWDEOH´ FRQGLWLRQ
([A]), a final utterance that was cancelling some non-inferential, non-theory-critical meaning 
RIWKHVDPHVSHDNHU¶VILUVWXWWHUance, representing WKH³XQDFFHSWDEOH´FRQGLWLRQ>1$@, and  a 
final utterance containing a phrase that was cancelling the implicature derived from the 
VSHDNHU¶V RULJLQDO XWWHUDQFH representing WKH ³FULWLFDO LWHP´ FRQGLWLRQ >&,@ The aim of 
having three cancellability conditions for each item was to create an additional item-specific 
measure, which would test whether the acceptability ratings in the ³critical´ condition are 
spread over a different range on the scale than those in the ³DFFHSWDEOH´DQG³XQDFFHSWDEOH´
conditions for the same item. This could also rule out any dialogue-specific interferences with 
the acceptability judgment, while, at the same timeLWHPVLQ³DFFHSWDEOH´DQG³XQDFFHSWDEOH´
                                                          
10
 The Qualtrics online survey software was used. 
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conditions functioned as fillers for the test. The triple condition required the construction of 
three different versions of the test, in a Latin square design (each item was present in only one 
of the three conditions in each test). The turn-taking structure used for all items is shown on 
Table 1: 
Turn 1:  Implicature trigger 
Turn 2:  ,QWHUORFXWRU¶V UHVSRQVHH[KLELWLQJUHWULHYDORIWKH
implicature) 
Turn 3: (version 1: [A]) Uneventful closure of the dialogue (without 
cancellation) 
 (version 2: [NA]) Contradiction: cancellation of a non-implicated 
meaning (assertion/entailment or presupposition) 
of the trigger utterance 
 (version 3: [CI]) Cancellation phrase    
Table 1 Turn-taking structure for test items 
Examples (10-13) present one of each 4 types of items in all three conditions (acceptable, 
unacceptable, and critical):  
(10) Type: PCI 
Context: The radiator is working at full power. Both John and Mary know that. 
John: It is really hot in here. 






(11) Type: T1 
Context: John and Mary were planning to go for a walk.  
John: It has just started raining! 2KWKDW¶VJRLQJWREHDJUHDWZDON 
A Thank you. 
NA %XWLW¶VQRWKRWLQKHUH 
CI 1R,GLGQ¶WPHDQWKDW,ZDQWHG\RXWRWXUQRIIWKHKHDWLQJ 
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(12) Type: T2 
Context: Mary is trying to persuade John to go on a road trip with their friend Jody, her three 
children, and their dogs. 
-RKQ7RDFFHSW-RGL¶VLQYLWDWLRQDQGJRRQDURDGWULSZLth her family? ,¶ve already made 
plans to have boiled eggs put under my armpits and sleep on a bed of spikes. 
Mary: You are exaJJHUDWLQJ,DPVXUH\RXDUHJRLQJWRUHJUHWLWLIZHGRQ¶WJR 
John:  
 
(13) Type: T1(Ox) 
Context: John and Mary are walking in the street when a group of big motorcycle riders 
passes by them, making a really loud noise with their motorcycles 
John: Here are the beloved unbearable Harley-Davidson riders again! 






Two questions were asked for each item:  (1) ³+RZDFFHSWDEOHLVZKDW-RKQVD\VDWWKHHQGRI
WKHGLDORJXH"´ ZLWK³DFFHSWDEOH´KDYLQJEHHQH[SODLQHGDV³PDNLQJVHQVH´DWWKHEHJLQQLQJ
of the test), followed by the 7-point rating scale, and (2) ³'R \RX detect any humorous 
A Never mind, we can stay home and watch a movie. 
NA But WKHUH¶VQRVLJQRIUDLQ 
C NR,UHDOO\WKLQNLW¶VJUHDW,¶d love to go out and walk in the rain.   
A And I am sure I am going to regret it if we do go. 
NA But Jodi did not invite us to go on a road trip with her family. 
 
C %XW , FDQ¶W FKDQJH P\ SODQV QRZ , DP UHDOO\ ORRNLQJ IRUZDUd to keeping boiled 
eggs under my armpits and lying on spikes during the weekend. 
A ,UHDOO\GRQ¶WJHWWKHLUZD\RIWKLQNLQJ 
NA %XW,¶YHQHYHUVHHQDQ\Harley-Davidson riders. 
C No, I really meant I find them absolutely lovable. 
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intentions in what John sa\V DW WKH HQG RI WKH GLDORJXH"´ IROORZHG E\ D ³\HVQRQRW VXUH´
block of options, which is relevant to the fourth hypothesis (H4). 
The test was taken by 30 participants (15 male and 15 female), monolingual native 
speakers of British English, aged from 18 to 28, of higher education, none of whom was a 
trained linguist. They were randomly divided into three groups of 10 (containing an equal 
number of males and females), each of which took one of the three different versions of the 
test. The test was completed online. Each participant gained access to it via a personalised 
link that allowed them to take the test once. The average duration of the test was 30 minutes 
and the subjects were paid £5 for their participation. 
5.2.2 Results  
All participants conformed to the requirements of the test and were judged as having 
understood the task correctly, so no participants were excluded from the analysis.  
The mean ratings and standard deviations for each type and each condition are shown on 
Table 2: 
 Acceptable [A] Critical [CI] Unacceptable [NA] 
PCI 6.65 (0.4) 4.39 (1.0) 1.66 (0.6) 
T1 6.31 (0.5) 4.78 (1.0) 1.80 (0.7) 
T2 6.13 (0.6) 4.60 (0.8) 2.27 (1.1) 
T1(Ox) 6.25 (0.5) 3.05 (0.7) 1.83 (0.6) 
Table 2 Test 1: Mean ratings of acceptability of cancellation - AC (and standard deviation) 
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for cancellability and type [3(A, NA, CI) x 4 
(PCI, T1, T2, T1Ox)], treating items and subjects as random factors11.  These revealed a main 
effect of cancellability (F1(2,358) = 951, p < 0.001, F2(2,136)= 640.19, p < 0.001), a main 
                                                          
11 Analysis by participants, with type as a within-subjects factor, cancellability as a within-subjects factor, and 
group as a between-subjects (counterbalancing) factor (F1). Analysis by items, with cancellability as a within-
items factor and type as a between-items factor (F2). 
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effect of type (F1(3,537) = 18.9, p < 0.001, F2(3,68)= 9.78,  p < 0.001) and an interaction of 
the two (F1(6,1074) = 19.1, p < 0.001, F2(6,136)= 7.85, p< 0.001). Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that AC ratings for the critical items [CI] fell between the ratings for [A] and [NA], 
being significantly different from both12. Comparisons between types revealed that the 
difference between T1 ironies and non-ironic PCIs was marginally not significant (t(179)= 
1.871, p=0.061), only weakly supporting H2 (i.e. that T1 ironies and PCIs are equally 
cancellable). Contrary to hypothesis H1, AC ratings for T2 ironies did not differ significantly 
from those for T1 ironies (t(179)=0.971, p=0.332) nor from those for non-ironic PCIs 
(t(179)= 1.206, p=0.229). On the other hand, as predicted by H3 (i.e. that oxymoron will be 
hard to cancel), the AC ratings for the co-textually reinforced type T1(Ox) differed 
significantly from every other tested type (T1(Ox) ± PCI: t(179)= 7.053, p<0.0001; T1(Ox) ± 
T1:t(179) = 9.558, p<0.0001; T1(Ox) ± T2: t(179)= 8.673, p<0.0001).  
Moving on to the question regarding humour, verifying H4, a very strong relation was 
found between Type2 ironies and the detection of humorous intentions in the cancellation 
utterance: 
Type: Ascription of humorous intentions to the cancellation utterance (%) 
 Humorous Non-Humorous Undecided 
PCI 28.4 57.6 14 
T1 45.3 34.7 20 
T2 85 7.8 7.2 
T1(Ox) 39.5 43.9 16.6 
Table 3 Test 1: [CI] cancellation utterance & humour 
The results on Table 3 concern the critical items [CI] and present the overall judgments 
(humorous, non-humorous, undecided) for each category. For T2 ironies, 85% of the 
                                                          
12
 Overall: [A]-[NA]: t(71)=35.85, p <0.001; [CI]-[A]: t(71)=14.88, p<0.001; [CI]-[NA]: t(71)=-14.98, p<0.001. 
Ironic Implicature Strength and Cancellability 
 
MXGJPHQWV ZHUH ³KXPRURXV´ ZKLFK LV FRQVLGHUDEO\ KLJKHU WKDQ WKH SHUFHQWDJH RI KXPRXU
detection in the other three categories. An additional method of verifying the relationship 
between T2 ironies and humour was to examine them item-by-item (18 items per category) 
and classiI\HDFKLWHPDVEHLQJFRQVLGHUHG³KXPRURXV´LQWKH>&,@FRQGLWLRQLIPRUHWKDQ
SDUWLFLSDQWV!FKRVHWKH³\HV´UHSO\LQWKHKXPRXUTXHVWLRQ7KLs showed that all 18 of 
the T2 irony items were considered humorous by the majority of participants in the [CI] 
condition, as opposed to 5 (27.8%) of the T1 irony items, 3 (16.6%) of the T1(Ox) items, and 
3 (16.6%) of the PCIs. 
In light of the above, a more informative interpretation of the results requires dividing the 
ratings into humour-oriented (ascription of humorous intention to the critical utterance) and 
literal-oriented (a rating is literal-oriented if the participant did not ascribe a humorous 
intention to the critical utterance WKHUHIRUH WDNLQJ LW DW ³IDFH YDOXH´). For this purpose, the 
ratings for each item, in all three conditions [A], [NA], [CI] were divided into three categories 
(humour, non-humour, undecided) and new means were calculated separately for each. The 
following table (Table 4) shows the recalculated means and standard deviations for +humour 
and -humour judgments. 
Condition: Acceptable [A] Critical [CI] Unacceptable [NA] 
         Humour: 
Type:    
+HUM -HUM +HUM -HUM +HUM -HUM 
PCI 6.10 (0.9) 6.76 (0.6) 4.80 (1.2) 4.36 (2.0) 3.29 (1.9) 1.48 (0.7) 
T1 6.49 (0.7) 6.17 (1.3) 4.92 (1.7) 4.56 (2.0) 3.22 (1.5) 1.36 (0.7) 
T2 6.30 (0.8) 6.08 (1.2) 4.90 (1.5) 2.25 (2.1) 3.78 (1.7) 1.89 (1.5) 
T1(Ox) 6.06 (1.3) 6.33 (1.0) 4.01 (1.7) 2.20 (1.5) 3.16 (1.8) 1.50 (0.9) 
Table 4 Test 1: Mean acceptability ratings (and standard deviation) for +humour and ±humour 
judgments 
Our interest, here, is the [CI] condition, although it is worth noting that a humorous 
interpretation also made a difference in the ratings of the [NA] condition (i.e. even when the 
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utterance contained a contradiction, it was not rated as low in a humour-oriented 
interpretation as in a literal-oriented interpretation). Figure 1 illustrates the differences in 
mean AC ratings of CIs for +humour, -humour, and n/a (undecided) humour judgements: 
 
Figure 1: Mean AC ratings for CIs including the +/- humour distinction 
 
T-tests were run (for unequal sample sizes/unequal variance) within each category, to 
determine whether the mean ratings for a +humour reply are significantly different from the 
mean ratings in a ±humour reply (see Table 5). For the [CI] condition, it was found that PCI 
and T1 ratings were not significantly different between +humour and ±humour (PCI: t(145)= 
1.694, p=0.0924; T1: t(113)= 1.1092, p= 0.269) but the difference between +humour and ±
humour ratings was highly significant in the case of both T1(Ox) and T2 (T1(Ox): t(140)= 
6.8813, p<0.0001; T2: t(14)= 4.6151, p= 0.0004). 
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These results lead to re-examining H1 and H2 (expecting a significant difference between the 
AC of T1 and T2 ironies, while not predicting a difference between T1 and PCI) separately 
for humour-oriented and literally-oriented ratings. T-tests were run to examine the 
significance of the difference in the AC ratings between all pairs of item types for both the 
+humour and the ±humour judgments. 
Results of t-tests (Welch t test) 
 
+humour ±humour 






























Table 5 Comparisons between all types (*significant, **extremely significant) 
The difference between T1(Ox) - T1 and between T1(Ox) - PCIs, which was already 
significant in the mixed results (table 2) is even more significant in the literal-oriented 
judgments. It is noteworthy, however, that the difference in AC ratings for T1(Ox) versus T2 
is no longer significant in the literal-oriented judgments, which shows that the cancellation of 
the ironic implicature is equally unacceptable for these two types. The main difference 
between the mixed (table 2) and the split (humour-sensitive) datasets lies in the comparison 
between T2 and T1 (significant for the literal-oriented judgements) and between T2 and non-
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ironic PCIs (also significant for the literal-oriented judgments). Therefore, in this analysis, the 
literal-oriented judgments (±humour) now confirm all hypotheses, including H1, which was 
not corroborated by the presentation of the mixed results. 
5.3 Test 2 
5.3.1 Methods and participants 
Seeing as a split in the dataset (+humorous/-humorous ratings) was important for a better 
understanding of the results of Test 1, it was considered useful to run a follow-up test in 
which no such split would be required. The design of this second test included the 
introduction of a new character (similar WRWKH³OLWHUDO/XF\´character used by Larson et al. 
2009) who would be the one to utter the cancellation phrase, biasing towards a literal-oriented 
interpretation. 
The items for this test were identical to those of Test 1, as it regards the first two turns of 
each dialogue. The difference was that the third turn (including the cancellation phrase for 
CIs) was uttered by a third character, who had not spoken in the dialogue before and would 
not be considered to be part of the humorous discourse framework created by the use of irony. 
This character was introduced at the beginning of the test as someone who is supposed to 
know the speaker (John) really well, to the extent that she always knows what he means. 
,QWURGXFWLRQRIWKH³/XF\´FKDUDFWHULQWKHWHVWLQVWUXFWLRQV 
³/XF\LVDEOHWRRYHUKHDUDOORI-RKQ¶VFRQYHUVDWLRQVDQGEHFDXVHVKHNQRZV
John quite well, she claims that she always knows what he means. After each 
dialogue, Lucy comes in and makes a statement about what John meant 
(sometimes different from what his interlocutor seems to have understood).´ 
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Below are two examples of the new form of the test items, which correspond to the items of 
the first test that were presented in (10) and (11): 
(15) Context: The radiator is working at full power. Both John and Mary know that. 
John: It is really hot in here. 
Mary: I will turn off the heating then. 












The test procedure was otherwise the same as in Test 1, except that there was no question 
about humorous intentions in this one. The test was taken by 30 participants (13 male and 17 
female), monolingual native speakers of British English, aged from 20 to 29, of higher 
education, none of whom was a trained linguist. None of them had participated in the first 
test. The participants were split into 3 groups, as in the first test, and the procedure of on-line 
participation was the same as in the first test.  
A John wanted Mary to turn off the heating 
NA  -RKQPHDQWLW¶VFROGLQWKHUH 
CI  -RKQGLGQ¶WPHDQKHZDQWHG0DU\WRWXUQRIIWKHKHDWLQJ 
A John meant that they are not going to enjoy the walk. 
NA  John diGQ¶WPHDQWKDWLWVWDUWHGUDLQLQJ 
CI  John really meant that they are going to enjoy the walk. 
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5.3.2 Results  
The mean ratings for each type and each condition are shown on Table 6: 
 Acceptable [A] Critical [CI] Unacceptable [NA] 
PCI 5.93 (0.8) 2.10 (0.5) 1.29 (0.4) 
T1 6.05 (0.7) 1.61 (0.5) 1.34 (0.6) 
T2 6.19 (0.5) 1.20 (0.2) 1.78 (1.0) 
T1(Ox) 6.25 (0.6) 1.24 (0.3) 1.28 (0.3) 
Table 6 Test 2: Mean ratings of acceptability (and standard deviation) 
As in the previous test, analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted for cancellability 
condition and type [3(A, NA, CI) x 4 (PCI, T1, T2, T1Ox)], treating items and subjects as 
random factors. These revealed a main effect of cancellability (F1(2,358) = 2095, p < 0.001, 
F2(2,136)=1285.58, p<0.001), an interaction of cancellability and type (F1(6,1074) = 17.3, p 
< 0.001, F2(6,136)=5.31, p<0.001) but only marginal main effect of type in the analysis by 
subjects (F1(3,537) = 2.68 p<0.046) and no main effect of type in the analysis by items 
(F2(3,68)=1.57, p=0.204). Pairwise t-tests for cancellability in each condition revealed that 
[CI] ratings were significantly lower than [A] ratings, but not significantly higher than those 
for [NA]13. This last finding (i.e. AC ratings for the CIs being as low as ratings for the NA 
condition) was specifically driven by non-significant [CI]-[NA] differences in the case of T1 
and T1(Ox), whereas there was a (relatively small) significance in the case of T2 and a high 
significance in the case of PCI (note the small or no significance in the case of all irony types, 
as opposed to non-ironic implicatures)14. 
                                                          
13 Overall: [A]-[NA]: t(71)= 41.45, p<0.001; [CI]-[A] (t(71)=37.85, p<0.001, [CI]-[NA]: t(71)=1.04, p=0.303. 
14 [CI]-[NA] comparisons per type: PCI: t(17)= 4.52, p= 0.0003; T1: t(17)= 0.14, p= 0.1783; T1(Ox): t(17)= 0.34, p= 
0.7361; T2: t(17)= 2.38, p= 0.0294. 
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Pairwise comparisons between each and every type revealed that the only two types that 
did not show significantly different AC ratings were T1(Ox) and T2 (t(179)= 0.615, 
p=0.5389), which coincides with the finding for the literal-oriented judgments in Test 1. The 
difference in AC ratings between the rest of the types, notably including T1 versus T2  was 
highly significant (supporting H1):  T1-T2: t(179)= 4.123, p<0.0001; T1-PCI: t(179)= 4.376, 
p<0.0001; T1-T1(Ox): t(179)= 3.387, p=0.0009; T1(Ox)-PCI: t(179)=7.052, p<0.0001; T2-
PCI: t(179)=8.053, p<0.0001. Overall, this second test supports H1 (difference between 
Type1 and Type2) and H3 (the oxymoron strategy being hard to cancel due to co-textual 
support), but does not corroborate H2, namely that the AC ratings would be similar for the T1 
and PCI types. 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
The overview of the ratings by each participant and for each separate item reveals that, as 
expected, AC ratings were spread across the 7-point scale, with many of the critical items [CI] 
receiving ratings that were significantly different from those for LWHPVLQWKH³DFFHSWDEOH´>$@
DQG³XQDFFHSWDEOH´>NA] condition (this was shown for all non-ironic PCIs in both tests). It 
was also shown, however, that participants gave more extreme (polarised) ratings when the 
cancellation phrase was uttered by a different character than the original speaker (Test 2), 
which leads to the following methodological consideration regarding the use of explicit 
cancellability as a test: participants do not just consider the logical possibility of the speaker 
having meant something other than the originally derived inference, but also the authority of 
the utterer of the cancellation phrase with respect to the original utterance (i.e. if the inference 
is explicitly cancelled by the original speaker, the cancellation is more acceptable/more likely 
than if it is offered by an external observer ± even if she is presenteG DV D VHHPLQJO\ ³DOO-
NQRZLQJ´FKDUDFWHU). 
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The empirical tests allowed us to uncover important differences among two different types 
of irony (including the oxymoron subtype of Type1) and non-ironic implicatures. Type2 
ironies exhibited a very strong link to humour, placing the whole discourse (including the 
cancellation phrase) within a humorous framework. Given this idiosyncrasy, splitting the 
ratings according to whether or not the cancellation phrase was perceived as humorously 
intended (and, arguably, non-serious) made an important difference in the results of Test 1: it 
was only within the literal-oriented ratings that the hypothesised difference between Type1 
and Type2 could be clearly observed. Of course, even the very fact that participants resorted 
to a non-serious reading of the cancellation phrase in order to make sense of it is an indication 
of how infelicitous the cancellation of Type2 ironies normally is (a testament to the strength 
of this type of implicature).  
Attempting to put the humour factor on the side, the second test introduced a bias towards a 
serious (literal) interpretation of the cancellation phrase. This allowed for the differences 
between the two irony types (including the oxymoron subtype, which remained significantly 
different from every other type in all tests and manipulations) and between ironic and non-
ironic implicatures to be demonstrated more clearly (corroborating H1 and H3). 
An unexpected finding of Test 2, for which there already was evidence in both the mixed 
and split results of Test 1, was the difference in cancellability between non-ironic PCIs and 
Type1 ironies (the latter being harder to cancel), against the predictions of H2. This finding 
indicates that ironic implicatures are inherently stronger than non-ironic ones, possibly due to 
WKH ³PDUNHG´UKHWRULFDO QDWXUH RI LURQLF XWWHUDQFHV IXQFWLRQLQJ DV DQ additional element of 
implicature strength. 
Overall, it was shown that speaker intuitions about explicit cancellability can reflect 
differences among types of implicatures. The test of explicit cancellability is therefore not 
(merely) an implicature detection tool, but a valid measure for implicature strength, which in 
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turn is influenced by various factors such as reasoning, contextual information, prior 
knowledge, co-textual and extralinguistic/paralinguistic cues.  
From this point onwards, while further empirical testing is necessary, factors of implicature 
(inferential) strength can be viewed as a helpful means of categorisation for cases of 
inferential meaning, cutting across the literal-nonliteral divide and revealing finer distinctions 
within levels of meaning that had so far been considered rather unified. 
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